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Note
Valuable in Life, Valuable in Death, Why Not
Valuable When Severely Injured? The Need to
Recognize a Parent's Loss of a Child's
Consortium in Minnesota
Scott Korzenowski
An American Linen truck struck and severely injured Trina
Holmin's sixteen-month-old son Matthew on July 27, 1992.' As
a result, Matthew is now unable to walk. He is unable to talk,
see, or communicate in any meaningful way. He cannot feed,
clothe, or bathe himself.2 Although a settlement paid Matthew
for his pain and suffering, and past, present and future medical
expenses,' what of the other harms? What of the intangible
harm to the relationship between Matthew and his mother,
Trina?
Minnesota courts recognize a parent's loss of companionship
with a child as both painful and real.4 The courts also charac-
terize the parent-child relationship as one that includes "natural
rights of such fundamental importance... that parents should
not be deprived of them."5 Yet when the negligence of a third
1. Jessica B. Merz, The Rock Crusher that Started Itself and Other Tales
ofDanger: This Year's Top Ten Personal Injury Recoveries Tell Stories of Human
Misery and Corporate Irresponsibilities, MINN. J.L. & POL., May 1995, at 9, 13.
The truck driver, it was later learned, may not have been wearing his
prescription eyeglasses at the time of the accident. Id.
2. Id.
3. The defendant corporation settled its claim with Matthew for five
million dollars. As a result of the settlement, the bulk of Matthew's tangible
needs will be provided for, with Trina, his mother, ideally suffering no
subsequent economic harm. Id.
4. Father A v. Moran, 469 N.W.2d 503, 505-06 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991). The
court said it recognized "the genuine loss and psychological suffering caused to
the parent of [an injured child] ... and... [found the parents'] argument to
have strong sympathetic appeal." Id.
5. In re Parks' Petition, 127 N.W.2d 548, 553 (Minh. 1964) (holding that
an adoption is not final until both parents have expressly and knowingly
consented). These rights include "custody, society, comfort, and services of the
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party injures a child so severely that the parents no longer enjoy
these "fundamental" rights inherent in the parent-child relation-
ship, Minnesota law does not allow the parent to recover
damages for this loss, most often referred to as consortium.6
This Note argues that Minnesota should recognize a parent's
loss of consortium claim when a third party negligently injures
a child so severely that the child loses his or her ability to
communicate and function in a meaningful way. Part I outlines
the history of the loss-of-consortium claim and the division
among states in recognizing such damages for parents or
children. This part also examines how the Minnesota Supreme
Court used precedent and policy to deny a child's claim for loss
of consortium arising out of a third party's negligence, and how
the Minnesota Court of Appeals relied upon that decision to deny
a similar claim by parents. Part II contends that the Minnesota
Supreme Court ignored much of its precedent protecting the
parent-child relationship when it expressly denied a child's claim
for loss of consortium with an injured parent. This part also
contends that the Minnesota Court of Appeals erred in relying
on this supreme court decision to deny, without an independent
analysis, a parent's claim for loss of consortium with a severely
injured child. This Note concludes by exhorting the Minnesota
courts to consider the unique situation of a parent's claim for
child." Id.
6. Father A, 469 N.W.2d at 506. 'The Minnesota Supreme Court has
explicitly denied a cause of action for loss of consortium in the parent-child
context. . .. [Sluch an expansion of parents' recovery is not consistent with
Minnesota law." Id.
Although the parent can bring a claim for loss of services and wages and
any applicable medical expenses incurred when a minor child is injured, the
courts prefer the child herself to bring any action regarding future medical
expenses. See Armentrout v. Virginian Ry. Co., 72 F. Supp. 997, 1002
(S.D.W.Va. 1947) (holding that "prospective expenses for care and nursing not
already incurred by the parent constitute a proper element of the infant's
recovery"), rev'd, 166 F.2d 400 (4th Cir. 1948); Rockwood v. Lansburgh, 293 P.
792, 794 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1930); Clarke v. Eighth Ave. R.R. Co., 144 N.E.
516, 517 (N.Y. 1924) (reasoning that payment to infant rather than parent
insures that money will more likely be used for the infant's benefit); Stone v.
City of Pleasanton, 223 P. 303 (Kan. 1924).
This can debilitate the parents' legal options, even when negligence is
certain. For example, an admittedly negligent tortfeasor can use a settlement
offer to the injured child to persuade the parents, who seek loss of consortium,
from pursuing their claim. By comparison, when a parent pursued a claim for
loss of consortium with a severely brain-damaged child in Arizona, the court
upheld a verdict of one million dollars. Reben v. Ely, 705 P.2d 1360 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1985).
678 [Vol. 80:677
LOSS OF CONSORTIUM
loss of consortium.
I. THE LOSS-OF-CONSORTIUM CLAIM WITHIN THE
PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP
A. LOSS-OF-CONSORTIUM CLAIM IN TORT LAW
The primary purpose of tort law is to compensate the
injured person at the expense of the wrongdoer.7 The function
of the courts is to determine when such compensation is
required.8 Typically, courts consider four factors before ruling
on a tort claim's validity: injury-did the plaintiff suffer harm?
factual causation-was the defendant responsible for the injury?
legal (or proximate) causation-should the court, as a matter of
public policy, hold the defendant responsible for the injury?
excuse-was the defendant sufficiently justified in taking the
apparently wrongful action?9
The defendant incurs no liability, regardless of the resulting
injury, when the law justifies or excuses the defendant's
action.' Similarly, the defendant incurs no liability, regardless
of fault, when the law either does not recognize the plaintiff's
claim as a legally compensable "injury," or does not classify the
injury as one for which the defendant should be held legally
responsible." The law will hold an at-fault defendant legally
liable for only three types of injuries: physical harms, harms of
appropriation, and harms to relational interests.'2 Loss of
consortium, broadly defined, encompasses the third of these
7. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 2, at 7 (5th ed. 1984). Unlike criminal law, which focuses on the protection
of the public at large "by punishing... [or] by deterring others from similar
conduct," tort law focuses on compensating the injured party. "So far as the
criminal law is concerned, the victim will leave the courtroom empty-handed...
[but] ... [i]f successful, the [civil tort] plaintiff receives a judgment for a sum
of money, enforceable against the defendant." Id.
8. Id. § 4, at 20.
9. See id. § 7, at 31. This classification of tort theory was first posited by
Dean Wigmore. John H. Wigmore, The Tripartite Division of Torts, 8 HARV. L.
REV. 200 (1894).
10. KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 85, at 608. "[Tlhe fault principle only
applies to conduct that is antisocial in the sense that its costs... outweigh its
benefits." Id. In relation to behavior intended to cause a harm, the fault
principle focuses on theories of justification. Id. In relation to behavior not
intended to cause a harm, the fault principle focuses on negligence. Id.
11. Id. "In both [intended and unintended harm] instances, the conduct is
determined not to be blameworthy when benefits outweigh costs." Id.
12. Id. § 7, at 31 (citing DEAN GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 9-13 (1930)).
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harms. 3 When public policy dictates, however, courts will
reject certain injuries within this sphere of compensable harm
as being too remote or unforeseeable. 4
Practically speaking, consortium encompasses the intangible
or non-economic benefits inherent in the interaction between
human beings. 5 Unlike other intangible values that are
compensated in tort, 6 consortium does not focus as directly on
the plaintiff's internal feelings. Rather, it attaches value to the
plaintiff's lost opportunity to derive benefit from other persons
in the plaintiff's life.' A loss-of-consortium claim, therefore, is
13. See Jacob Lippman, The Breakdown of Consortium, 30 COLUM. L. REV.
651, 666 (1930). Consortium is the relationship interest between husband and
wife encompassing "the mutual right of the parties to the society, companion-
ship and affection of each other." Id. (quoting Marri v. Stamford St. R.R., 78 A.
582 (1911)). Minnesota courts have defined consortium as encompassing
elements such as "comfort, companionship, and commitment to the needs of
each other." Thill v. Modern Erecting Co., 170 N.W.2d 865,867-68 & n.2 (Minn.
1969) (citing Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 239 N.E.2d 897,899 (N.Y.
1968)).
14. This is the essence of proximate cause. Consequently, when only one
type of loss-of-consortium claim is rejected (parent-child), while other types are
maintained (husband-wife), the court is deciding that the plaintiffs injury,
although within the realm of compensable legal harms, will not be compensated
because of overriding public policy. See Salin v. Kloempken, 322 N.W.2d 736
(Minn. 1982) (rejecting a child's claim for loss of consortium); Father A v.
Moran, 469 N.W.2d 503 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (rejecting a parent's claim for
loss of consortium). In both Salin and Father A, the issue of the defendant's
negligence was stipulated. In both cases, however, the plaintiff failed to recover
despite the existence of compensable injury to the relationship. The courts
decided that public policy precluded compensation for such an injury. Salin,
322 N.W.2d at 742 (explaining that "in the interest of limiting the legal
consequences of the wrong to a controllable degree, a new cause of action on
behalf of a child for the loss of parental consortium should not be recognized");
Father A, 469 N.W.2d at 506 (holding that although the defendant was at fault,
the parents could not recover because "[tihe Minnesota Supreme Court has
explicitly denied a cause of action for loss of consortium in the parent-child
context"); see also Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d 858, 862 (Calif.
1977) (denying a child's claim for loss of consortium in part because "the courts
must locate the line of liability and nonliability at some point, a decision which
is essentially political") (quoting Suter v. Leonard, 120 Cal. Rptr. 110, 111
(1975)). In essence, the court is deciding that the defendant, although
responsible for the harm in fact, is not liable for the harm in law.
15. 'The loss of companionship, emotional support, love [and] felicity...
are real injuries." Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 239 N.E.2d 897,899
(N.Y. 1968).
16. Examples include infliction of emotional distress and pain and suffering.
17. "Terms such as 'loss of society and companionship' or 'loss of love and
companionship' " best characterize the basis of this claim. Jean C. Love,
Tortious Interference with the Parent-Child Relationship: Loss of an Injured
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usually treated as a derivative claim. 8 Thus a plaintiff's
otherwise independent loss-of-consortium claim is based upon
the defendant's breach of duty to a third party.9
Although at its inception courts based loss of consortium
upon elements unique to the marital relationship, they have
expanded loss of consortium to include elements common to the
Person's Society and Companionship, 51 IND. L.J. 590, 617 (1976). Although
Love's discussion centers on the loss of consortium between parent and child,
the more traditional loss of consortium between husband and wife has been
defined similarly. In Minnesota, for example, loss of consortium is described as
"reciprocal rights inherent" in the marital relationship. Thill, 170 N.W.2d at
867-68 & n.2.
Definitions of "loss of consortium" vary among the states. Examples of
terms and phrases used include: "love," WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.010 (West
1988); "injury to or destruction of the ... relationship," id.; "care, protection,
support and affection," Suter v. Leonard, 45 Cal. App. 3d 744, 745, 120 Cal.
Rptr. 110, 111 (1975) (recovery denied); "pleasure," Hair v. County of Monterey,
45 Cal. App. 3d 538, 545, 119 Cal. Rptr. 639, 644 (1975); "deprivtation] ... of
the family relationship," and sustaining the "loss of companionship and
association, the care, attention, kindness, maternal guidance, comfort and solace
of [a] mother's society," Hankins v. Derby, 211 N.W.2d 581, 581-82 (Iowa 1973)
(recovery denied); "aid, comfort, society and companionship," Shockley v. Prier,
225 N.W.2d 495, 499 (Wis. 1975).
"In essence, the cause of action for loss of consortium has recognized one's
legal rights in the well-being of another." Michael A. Mogill, And Justice for
Some: Assessing the Need to Recognize the Child's Action for Loss of Parental
Consortium, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1321, 1360 n.236 (1992). The most broad,
comprehensive definition would be an "injury to [a human] relationship." Love,
supra, at 617.
18. Huffer v. Kozitza, 375 N.W.2d 480, 482 (Minn. 1985). That is, the claim
alleges injuries independent from the injuries asserted in the original claim.
The fault in the derivative claim, meanwhile, is the same as that asserted in
the original claim. Thus, the claim for loss-of-consortium damages, while
dependent upon the determination of fault in the original cause of action,
remains a separate damages claim. E.g., Kohler v. Fletcher, 442 N.W.2d 169,
173 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that one spouse's loss-of-consortium claim
fails if the other spouse's underlying tort claim fails). But see Cole v. Fair
Oakes Fire Protection Dist., 729 P.2d 743, 752 (1987) ("[T]he cause of action for
loss of consortium is not merely derivative or collateral to the spouse's cause of
action.").
19. The third party, of course, is the plaintiff in the direct claim. The direct
claim is based upon the physical or mental harm inflicted upon a person with
whom the loss-of-consortium plaintiff had a relationship interest. See Mogill,
supra note 17, at 1374-76 (arguing that although the defendant may not owe a
duty to the loss-of-consortium plaintiff, it is an invalid reason for denying a
consortium action). "[Duty] is a shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather
than an aid to analysis in itself .... '[Diuty' is not sacrosanct in itself, but is
only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead
the law to say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection." KEETON ET AL., supra
note 7, § 53, at 356.
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parent-child relationship." Despite the willingness to compen-
sate relational interests common to both the marital and
parental relationships, most courts continue to arbitrarily limit
loss-of-consortium damages to the spousal relationship.21
B. HISTORIcAL REJECTION OF LOSS-OF-CONSORTIUM CLAIMS
IN PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIPS
Historically, American courts refused to recognize parents'
claims for the lost benefit of their relationships with their
children caused by the unintentional fault of another.22 Most
courts limited a parent's recovery to the child's medical expenses
and lost services or earning capacity.' Many courts deter-
mined that the non-pecuniary or intangible harm to the
parental relationship from a negligent tort was, for policy
reasons, too remote or difficult to measure." The courts'
original policy behind limiting a parent's claim for damages to
only tangible harm stemmed from their classification of the
20. HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES § 11.1, at 383 (2d ed. 1988). Although consortium's genesis can
be found in the right to compensation for the invasion of the marital relation-
ship, "C[i]t is useful to refer also to the parent-child relationship as constituting
consortium." Id. In the context of the parent-child relationship, however, "the
word summarizes the multitude of rights and duties binding parents to their
children and vice versa." Id. Clark defines consortium as "a useful though
ambiguous term." Id. at 382. In the spousal relationship "it [is] used to denote
... the right to ... services, society, companionship, assistance and sexual
relations .... " Id. Although the parent-child relationship does not include a
sexual component, many courts have focused on the intangible elements
inherent in the parental relationship and have recognized a loss of consortium
claim. Id. at 385.
21. See infra notes 32-36, 53-54 and accompanying text (discussing the
courts' policy reasons for denying recovery).
22. See, e.g., Shockley v. Prier, 225 N.W.2d 495, 497-500 (Wis. 1975)
(stating the former common law position that parents could not recover for loss
of consortium for negligent injury to their child); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 703, at 510 (1976) (discussing limits on parental recovery
to loss of services and medical expenses).
23. KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 125, at 934-35.
24. By definition, loss of consortium is limited to those elements that make
a relationship human. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text (describing
the emotional component of loss of consortium).
25. See Smith v. Richardson, 171 So. 2d 96 (Ala. 1965); Baxter v. Superior
Court, 563 P.2d 871, 872-73 (Cal. 1977); Siciliano v. Capital City Shows, Inc.,
475 A.2d 19, 22-24 (N.H. 1984); Brennan v. Biber, 225 A.2d 742, 750-52 (N.J.
1966).
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parent-child relationship as purely economic." Courts mea-
sured the value of children according to their ability to provide
labor and earn wages." Likewise, courts in the past have
applied a similar rationale in denying a wife's claim for loss of
consortium with an injured husband.2"
American courts went on to reject this distinction in 1950,29
26. Like a servant to a master, a child was first and foremost a hired hand.
The origin of the consortium action at common law was the right of the master
to recover for tortious injury to his servants. KEETON ET AL., supra note 7,
§ 125, at 931. By 1619, this concept was expanded to allow a husband to
recover for lost services when his wife was tortiously injured. Eventually, these
services grew to include loss of society, companionship, affection and sexual
relations, or what is commonly known today as consortium. Id. Likewise, a
father eventually was allowed to recover for the lost services of his child.
Unlike the loss of his wife's services, the loss of his child's services did not
expand to include a loss of society and companionship. Id. at 934. "[A] child,
like a servant, was thought to be solely an economic asset to his family because
he was another source of income...." Michael B. Victorson, Torts-Parent's
Recovery For Loss of Society and Companionship of Child, 80 W. VA. L. REV.
340, 340 (1978).
27. When the United States had an agricultural economy, courts measured
the value of the parent-child relationship according to the child's labor and
ability to earn wages. Not surprisingly, courts limited claims based upon the
damaged parent-child relationship on the reduction of the child's economic value
to the family. For a discussion of the historical development of actions for
interference with the parent-child relationship, see JOHN W. SALMOND,
SALMOND ON THE LAW OF TORTS 501-06 (R.F.V. Heuston ed., 14th ed. 1965)
(explaining that parents must prove damages as a loss of a child's services) and
PERCY H. WINFIELD, WINFIELD ON TORT 527-32 (J-A. Jolowicz & T. Ellis Lewis
eds., 8th ed. 1967).
28. While a husband could recover for the loss of the injured wife's "society
and aid," a wife could not recover for loss of her husband's consortium. E.g.,
Hyde v. Scyssor, 79 Eng. Rep. 462 (K.B. 1619); see Lippman, supra note 13, at
664-65 ("Mhe wife sustains only the loss of the comfort of her husband's society
and affectionate attention, which the law cannot estimate or remedy.") (quoting
Lynch v. Knight, 9 H.L. Cas. 577, 598-99 (1861)); see also Love, supra note 17,
at 600 n.43 (citing English cases that included society and companionship
within a wife's services).
Not only did courts hold a wife, as a dependant of her husband, incapable
of recovery, they held that her rights within the relationship were purely non-
economic, and therefore without a remedy. Love, supra note 17, at 600 n.47.
Love presents the classic explanation for the inability of servants, wives and
children to sue: "We may observe that, in these relative injuries, [i.e., injuries
to the master-servant, husband-wife and parent-child relationships], notice is
only taken of the wrong done to the superior of the parties related.., while the
loss of the inferior by such injuries is totally unregarded." Id. (quoting 3
WILLiAM BLAcKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 142-43
(1768)).
29. Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (holding that a
wife had equal rights to recover for loss of consortium in the spousal relation-
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however, and presently forty-four states and the District of
Columbia recognize a wife's, as well as a husband's, right to sue
for the complete value of their spousal relationship."° Likewise,
states began to recognize a similar claim for parents and
children when the relationship was either severed by death or
severely damaged by intentional interference.3
C. COURTS' BELATED RECOGNITION OF PARENTS' Loss OF
CONSORTIUM WITH A SEVERELY INJURED CHILD
Although the value of the parent-child relationship was
becoming less reliant upon the child's ability to provide labor or
earn wages, 32 courts until 1975 continued to reject both
parents' and children's claims seeking damages for the non-
economic loss caused by third parties who negligently harmed
the parent-child relationship.33 Some courts adhered to the
myth that a child was little more than an employee.' Others
focused on the differences in the spousal and parental relation-
ships, most notably the sexual component of marriage.3 5 Most
ship for the negligent injury to her husband).
30. The six states that deny a wife's claim for loss of consortium also deny
a husband's claim for loss of consortium. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-2-4 (1953);
VA. CODE ANN. § 55-36 (Michie 1950); Roseberry v. Starkovich, 387 P.2d 321,
324-26 (N.M. 1963); Cozart v. Chapin, 241 S.E.2d 144, 145-46 (N.C. Ct. App.
1978); Ellis v. Hathaway, 493 P.2d 985, 986 (Utah 1972); see also Mogill, supra
note 17, at 1333-34 nn.68-69 (listing states that do and do not recognize a wife's
claim for loss of spousal consortium).
Minnesota recognized a wife's claim for loss of her husband's consortium in
1969. Thill v. Modern Erecting Co., 170 N.W.2d 865 (Minn. 1969). The court
in Thill explained, "The loss of 'services' is an outworn fiction, and the wife's
interest in the undisturbed relation with her consort is no less worthy of
protection than that of the husband." Id. at 868 (citations omitted).
31. See CLARK, supra note 20, § 11.2, at 385 ("[In today's world, the child
generally performs no substantial services, so ... the essence of the suit is the
[intentional] interference with the totality of the relationship between parent
and child . .. ."); KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, §§ 124, 125, 127 (discussing
interference with family relations, injuries to members of the family, and
actions under wrongful death statutes).
32. "Since the services rendered to the parent by the child are in fact
largely insignificant today, the characterization of the parent's suit as one for
loss of services has become a fiction." CLARK, supra note 20, § 11.2, at 385.
33. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing the historical
reluctance of courts to grant recovery).
34. See, e.g., Smith v. Richardson, 171 So. 2d 96, 100 (Ala. 1965) (only
permitting parents to recover for loss of their injured child's labor and
assistance).
35. Among those states relying most upon this differentiation is Minnesota.
See Salin v. Kloempken, 322 N.W.2d 736, 739 (Minn. 1982) ("IT]he spousal
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courts, however, relied upon the absence of precedent, or policy
reasons such as limited foreseeability, remoteness and uncertain-
ty of damages, potential double recovery and multiple suits, and
increased insurance costs. 6
In 1975, an American court expressly rejected these
arguments for the first time. 7 In Shockley v. Prier,38 the
Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed an order dismissing the
parents' claim for the loss of their minor son's consortium.3 9
The parents alleged that the doctors who treated their prema-
turely born son negligently gave their infant excessive amounts
of oxygen,4° causing blindness and permanent disfigurement.4
The court concluded that it required "little imagination to see
the shattering effect that [the child's] blindness will have on the
relationship between him and his parents."42 Consequently, the
court held that the law should recognize the "right of parents to
action rests in large part on the deprivation of sexual relations and the
accompanying loss of childbearing opportunity, which does not exist as an
element of damages in the child's action." (citations omitted)); see also CLARK,
supra note 20, § 11.4, at 400 (noting that courts have held that "consortium is
a relationship applying only to husband and wife").
36. See Wilson v. Gait, 668 P.2d 1104, 1110-12 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983); see
also Baxter v. Superior Court, 563 P.2d 871 (Cal. 1977) (holding that a parent
cannot recover for loss of a child's consortium); Borer v. American Airlines, Inc.,
563 P.2d 858 (Cal. 1977) (holding that a child cannot recover for loss of a
parent's consortium). In Baxter, the court said policy considerations holding
against recognition of such a claim included the intangible character of the loss,
the difficulty of measuring damages, the dangers of double recovery and
extensive liability. Baxter, 563 P.2d at 873.
37. Shockley v. Prier, 225 N.W.2d 495, 499-500 (Wis. 1975). The court
explained, "We submit that today's relationship between parents and children
is, or should be, more than that between master and servant." Id. at 500. "We
conclude that the law should recognize the right of parents to recover for loss
of aid, comfort, society and companionship of a child during minority when such
loss is caused by the negligence of another." Id. at 499. The court further
explained:
"T]he 'remedy' of loss of minor's earning capacity during minority
is of diminishing significance. Since our court last laid down the rule
in 1925, the family relationship has changed. Society and companion-
ship between parents and their children are closer to our present day
family ideal than the right of parents to the 'earning capacity during
minority,' which once seemed so important when the common law was
originally established."
Id.
38. 225 N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1975).
39. Id. at 501.
40. Id. at 496.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 499.
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recover for loss of aid, comfort, society and companionship of a
child during minority when such loss is caused by the negligence
of another."
4 3
Since that time, eight other states have followed the
Wisconsin Supreme Court's reasoning and recognized a parent's
right to bring a loss-of-consortium claim.' Another four states
have recognized or created such a right via statute or rule.4"
Those states recognizing a parent's claim did so because they
considered the loss of society and companionship in the parent-
child relationship to be the same, if not greater, than the losses
43. Shockley v. Prier, 225 N.W.2d 495, 499 (Wis. 1975). Although it is
beyond the scope of this Note, a parent's right to recover for loss of consortium
with a severely injured child has not always been limited to the child's minority.
E.g., Frank v. Superior Court, 722 P.2d 955, 960 (Ariz. 1986) (discussing
reasons for the court's holding that compensable consortium should not end at
age 18); see also Timothy D. Ament, Parents' Loss of Consortium Claims for
Adult Children in Iowa: The Magical Age of Eighteen, 41 DRAKE L. REV. 247,
§ 111 (1992) (discussing reasons why the Arizona Supreme Court rejected policy
arguments against extension of consortium claims to adult children).
44. Those states are: Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana,
Michigan, Missouri, and Ohio. Mogill, supra note 17, at 1337 n.83.
45. Those states' applicable laws are IDAHO CODE § 5-310 (1979), UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 78-11-6 to -7 (1953), WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.24.010 (1983),
and IowA R. Civ. P. 8. Of the thirteen states that recognize a parent's claim for
loss-of-consortium damages, six also have recognized a child's claim for loss of
consortium (Arizona, Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, Washington and Wisconsin).
Five of the thirteen, despite recognizing a parent's claim for loss of consortium,
has expressly rejected a child's claim for loss of consortium (Colorado, Idaho,
Illinois, Missouri, Ohio and Utah). Two states that have rejected a parent's
claim for loss of consortium, have meanwhile recognized a child's claim for loss
of consortium (Michigan and Wyoming). Michigan recognized a parent's cause
of action in Bias v. Ausbury, 120 N.W.2d 233, 235-36 (Mich. 1963), but
subsequently rejected it in Sizemore v. Smock, 422 N.W.2d 666 (Mich. 1988).
The remaining states have either rejected the Shockley reasoning altogether, or
simply failed to recognize a familial claim for loss of consortium.
Typical among these states is California, which rejected the concept as it
relates both to parents seeking loss of consortium for injuries to their children
and children seeking loss of consortium for injuries to their parents. Baxter v.
Superior Court, 563 P.2d 871 (Cal. 1977); Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 563
P.2d 858 (Cal. 1977). Although the two claims are often bunched under the
heading "parental loss of consortium," there are some significant differences
between the two. Primary among these is the differing statute of limitations.
Generally, the statute of limitations is tolled until a person reaches majority.
Consequently, minor children could bring a loss-of-consortium action many
years after the commission, and perhaps, after the completed adjudication of a
single tort. Therefore, it is common for states that recognize a parental loss of
consortium to require the derivative loss-of-consortium action to be joined to the
victim's cause of action. Love, supra note 17, at 590, 627, 632.
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felt in the spousal relationship.46 In reaching this conclusion,
these courts looked toward analogous tort law in holding that it
would be anomalous to sustain recovery when the parent-child
relationship is harmed by wrongful death or intentional interfer-
ence, but not when the relationship is harmed by a negligently
caused injury.47 Some states concluded that continuation of
this distinction would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution."8 Other states relied upon the
nature of the parent-child relationship and its evolution since
agricultural times.49 Such holdings are supported by empirical
46. CLARK, supra note 20, § 11.1, 383; see also Reighley v. International
Playtex, Inc., 604 F. Supp 1078, 1081 (D. Colo. 1985) (discussing the court's
duty to sanction and protect parent-child relationships as much as husband-wife
relationships).
47. Reighley, 604 F. Supp at 1082 (citing numerous cases recognizing a
child's claim for loss-of-consortium damages).
48. The Equal Protection Clause states that: "No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. "Such equal-
protection guarantees prohibit the creation of a classification that does not bear
an adequate relationship to state objectives purportedly served by the
classification." Love, supra note 17, at 606 n.89. The standard of review in
determining the adequacy of the classifications regarding loss of consortium
would most likely be rational basis, the lowest level of scrutiny. In other words,
whether the classification bears a rational relation to the law's purported
purpose. Id.
The classifications most often argued are parents whose children are killed
compared to parents whose children are seriously injured, and persons whose
spouses are severely injured compared to persons whose children are severely
injured. In both cases, the first group can recover for loss of consortium but the
second one cannot.
In Minnesota, both arguments have been rejected by the Minnesota
Supreme Court. Salin v. Kloempken, 322 N.W.2d 736, 740, 742 (Minn. 1982).
The court applied a form of the rational basis test, asking if the two classes
were situated similarly. The court held that the parent-child relationship was
not similarly situated to the spousal relationship, and thus did not support a
new cause of action on behalf of children for the loss of parental consortium.
Id.
49. Shockley v. Prier, 225 N.W.2d 495, 488-99 (Wis. 1975). In recognizing
a parent's claim for loss of consortium regardless of the child's age, an Arizona
court said:
"[Tioday a plethora of laws aimed at children, e.g., child labor and
compulsory education laws, virtually guarantees that children will not
be an economic asset to their parents. Children are now valued for
their society and companionship and '[t]he true significance of a
parent's action under modern practice is that it compensates the
parent's emotional losses when their child is injured.'"
Frank v. Superior Court, 722 P.2d 955, 959 (Ariz. 1986) (quoting Note, The
Child's Right to Sue for Loss of A Parent's Love, Care and Companionship
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evidence showing that people in the United States are willing to
spend thousands of dollars not only to acquire children, but to
raise and educate them, often well into the children's adult
years."° As these studies conclude, the value of the parent-
child relationship in 1990s America is measurable, at least in
part, by the money spent to create and nurture this relation-
ship.51
Most states rejecting the claim, meanwhile, have done so on
proximate cause or legal grounds.52 In other words, they have
drawn an arbitrary line in the tort-law sand. Many of the courts
that reject claims for damage to the parent-child relationship
nevertheless admit that the wrongful act of the tortfeasor did in
fact severely harm or even destroy the relationship.53 These
Caused By Tortious Injury to the Parent, 56 B.U. L. REV. 722, 731-32 (1976)).
50. Patrick Reardon, Top Threat to Family: No Time for the Kids, CHI.
TRIB., Oct. 10, 1991, § 1, at 1 (quoting Dr. Lee Salk, who was referring to a
survey of 1200 persons conducted in June 1989 for Massachusetts Mutual Life
Insurance Corp. in which 63% listed their family as the greatest source of
pleasure in their lives); see also Susan J.G. Alexander, A Fairer Hand: Why
Courts Must Recognize the Value of a Child's Companionship, 8 COOLEY L. REV.
273, 312-15 (1991) (citing figures from various sources of the cost of raising
children, and arriving at the conclusion that raising children is expensive).
51. MARY ANN GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY 18
(1981). Glendon writes: "In a purely economic sense [children] are liabilities
rather than assets. That people keep having them anyway despite the cost, is,
... a 'revolutionary' change." Id.
Economists account for this revolutionary change on the grounds that
children provide parents with "psychic income." Euston Quah & William
Rieber, Value of Children in Compensation for Wrongful Death, 9 INT'L REV. L.
& ECON. 165, 169-70 (1989) (refuting the historical view that a child's value is
based upon the supplementation of the family income).
None of this is meant to assert that the parent-child relationship is a zero-
sum gain, that is, worth only the money that is spent to create and maintain
the relationship. Only that the amount of money spent on the relationship is
an indication of the value many parents place on the relationship.
52. Salin, 322 N.W.2d at 737 (rejecting a child's claim for loss of consortium
on the basis that "legal causation must terminate somewhere" after stating that
"f[t]here can be no doubt that the children's claims have both logical and
sympathetic appeal"). In rejecting the claim for loss-of-consortium damages,
courts could argue that the tortfeasor has no duty to the injured party's parents,
and therefore no liability. This argument would be equally applicable to
spousal consortium claims, however, and would not differentiate between the
two. Thus, courts that allow spousal loss-of-consortium damages but choose to
deny parental loss-of-consortium damages are forced to hang their hats on the
causation element, which the Minnesota Supreme Court admitted"is a question
of policy." Id.
53. See, e.g., Father A v. Moran, 469 N.W.2d 503, 505 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991)
(explicitly recognizing "the genuine loss and psychological suffering caused to
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courts have made a policy decision, however, to allow spousal
loss-of-consortium claims while disallowing parental loss-of-
consortium claims.54
D. MINNESOTA'S REJECTION OF THE LOSS-OF-CONSORTIUM
CLAIM IN PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIPS:
PRECEDENT AND POLICY
The Minnesota Supreme Court in 1908 originally recognized
loss-of-consortium damages by allowing a husband to recover
such damages following an injury to his wife." The damages
included those elements "peculiar to the relationship ... [such
as] deprivation of her services, society, expense, and the like."56
It was not until 1969, however, that Minnesota allowed a wife's
claim for loss of consortium with her husband." Minnesota has
not yet expressly extended loss-of-consortium damages beyond
the spousal relationship.
1. The Minnesota Supreme Court's Limitation of
Loss-of-Consortium Claims to Spousal Relationships
The Minnesota Supreme Court in Salin v. Kloempken held
that a child could not claim loss of consortium with an injured
parent.5" Salin's holding specifically denied a claim of loss-of-
consortium damages by the child of a quadriplegic parent. The
court subsequently explained in dicta that, if presented with a
parent's claim for loss of consortium for an injured child, it would
deny such damages.59 In conclusion, the court stated that such
the parent").
54. In Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., the California Supreme Court held
that "social policy must at some point intervene to delimit liability.... 'Every
injury has ramifying consequences, like the ripplings of the waters, without end.
The problem for the law is to limit the legal consequences of wrongs to a
controllable degree.'" Borer, 563 P.2d 858, 861-62 (Calif. 1977) (quoting Tobin
v. Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424 (N.Y. 1969)).
55. Mageau v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 115 N.W. 651 (Minn. 1908).
56. Id. at 652.
57. Thill v. Modern Erecting Co., 170 N.W.2d 865 (Minn. 1969). In this
case, the court said: "The loss of 'services' is an outworn fiction, and the wife's
interest in the undisturbed relation with her consort is no less worthy of
protection than that of the husband." Id. at 869 (citations omitted).
58. Salin v. Kloempken, 322 N.W.2d 736, 742 (Minn. 1982).
59. The Minnesota Supreme Court came to the conclusion in dicta that a
parent's claim for loss of consortium falls outside the limits upon which social
policy must intervene to delimit liability: "There are significant differences
between the marital relationship and the parent-child relationship that support
the limitation of a cause of action for loss of consortium to the marital
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claims "should be limited to the spousal relationship.""
Although the court briefly discussed precedent 6' and equal-
protection arguments,62 it ultimately analyzed the policies
surrounding the issue by undertaking "an exercise in delineating
liability.
63
relationship." Id. at 739 (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 739. The policy considerations the supreme court espoused in
denying a parental claim for loss of consortium focused on the lack of a sexual
component in the parental relationship, and precedent limiting a parent's
recovery to medical expenses and lost services. Id. at 738-39.
61. In rejecting the claim, the court cited two cases. The first, Plain v.
Plain, 240 N.W.2d 330 (Minn. 1976), held that a child could not recover
damages from his or her mother for the loss of maternal services when the
mother negligently injured herself. Salin, 322 N.W.2d at 738. The second,
Eschenbach v. Benjamin, 263 N.W. 154 (Minn. 1935), held that plaintiff
children have no cause of action against a third person who negligently caused
permanent and disabling injuries to their father. Salin, 322 N.W.2d at 738.
The court quickly limited the persuasive effect of either case, however, by
stating that it declined to recognize a child's cause of action for loss of
consortium with a parent because of "prior cases." Id.
62. Among the arguments favoring recognition of loss-of-consortium
damages, the court rejected those maintaining equal-protection violations.
Salin, 322 N.W.2d at 742. The court reasoned that minor children are not
situationally similar to spouses. Id. The court also concluded that children
allowed to recover for loss of consortium under the wrongful death statute are
not situationally similar to children whose parents remained alive. Id. The
court found two specific differences. First, children who are eligible to recover
under the wrongful death statute will recover only as a class, meaning that
"there is but a single recovery on behalf of all beneficiaries." Id. Second,
surviving children are totally deprived of their parent's presence while plaintiffs
in an injury case are only partially deprived. Id.
Both arguments, however, are inapplicable to the case where a parent seeks
loss of consortium with a severely injured child. One important difference is
that every child has at most two parents, thus limiting recovery to a maximum
of two people. Further, courts could hold that the parents can recover loss of
consortium with a severely injured child only as a class. Two, it is naive to
argue that the parent of a child, who is so severely injured that she cannot
communicate in any meaningful way, is only "partially deprived" of that child's
consortium.
63. Salinv. Kloempken, 322 N.W.2d 736,739 (Minn. 1982). Although many
other courts have held that recognition of parental loss of consortium was a
proper issue only for the legislature, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated it
would not "rely on the rationale of those cases that have relegated this matter
to the legislature." Id. at 741 (citing Pleasant v. Washington Sand & Gravel
Co., 262 F.2d 471,473 (D.C. Cir. 1958); General Electric Co. v. Bush, 498 P.2d
366, 371 (Nev. 1972); Duhan v. Milanowski, 348 N.Y.S.2d 696, 703 (Sup. Ct.
1973)). The court also refused to rely on the scarcity of precedent recognizing
loss of parental consortium in other states. Salin, 322 N.W.2d at 741. "Lack
of precedent cannot absolve a common law court from responsibility for
adjudicating each claim that comes before it on its own merits." Id.
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The court determined that many of the policy considerations
it relied upon in Stadler v. Cross64 to limit the "circle of liabili-
ty" in emotional and mental distress causes of action were
equally reliable in denying a claim for loss-of-consortium
damages.65 Those policies included: the threat of expansive
litigation that comes with any derivative suit;66 the potential
that juries might award damages for loss of consortium both in
the parents' derivative claim and in the child's direct claim;67
the lack of a physical injury and the accompanying potential for
fraudulent claims;6" the lack of foreseeability;69 the extended
burden such damages will have on insurance companies; and the
difficulty in determining the "intangible nature of the child's
loss."7 Thus "in the interest of limiting the legal consequences
of the wrong to a controllable degree," the court chose to restrict
loss of consortium to the spousal relationship.7'
2. Minnesota's Willingness to Protect Parent-Child
Relationships in Wrongful Death, Intentional Interference,
Adoption, and Wrongful Birth Cases
Although the Minnesota Supreme Court explained its
decision in Salin as based on "precedent and ... public
policy,"72 it ignored many other decisions directly protecting the
parent-child relationship. For example, when a tortfeasor, either
negligently or intentionally, causes the death of a child,
Minnesota's wrongful death statute allows parents to recover for
the loss of a deceased child's comfort, aid, and society.73
Likewise, the Minnesota Supreme Court's holding in Miller v.
64. 295 N.W.2d 552 (Minn. 1980) (adopting the zone-of-danger limitation
to all claims seeking emotional and mental distress with resultant physical
symptoms).
65. Salin, 322 N.W.2d at 739.
66. Id. at 738-39. A derivative suit in tort is one in which the plaintiff is
not the party directly injured by the alleged tortfeasor. Instead, the plaintiff
claims that the effect of the injury on the injured party has or will affect the
plaintiff in a negative way.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 739.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 740-41.
71. Id. at 742.
72. Id.
73. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 573.02 (West Supp. 1994). Although the statute
limits damages to "pecuniary loss resulting from the death," the supreme court
has interpreted this to include compensation for comfort, assistance, and
companionship. Fussner v. Andert, 113 N.W.2d 355, 358-59 (Minn. 1961).
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Monsen74 allows either a parent or child to claim loss of con-
sortium when intentional interference by a third party damages
their relationship.75 The supreme court has also expressly
protected the relationship in the area of adoption.76
In addition, the court has expressly recognized the value of
emotional benefits of the parent-child relationship in tort.77 In
Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic,7" the supreme court recognized a
parent's claim for wrongful conception. 9 In determining just
compensation for the plaintiff parents, the court did two things.
First, it quantified the expenses associated with raising a child
to the age of majority. Second, it mitigated those expenses by
the value of the child's "aid, comfort, and society." ° The court
subsequently explained that, because a child's "pecuniary
benefits [to the family is] minimal," the amount of a child's "aid,
comfort and society" was the "only" way a court could accurately
compensate those benefits that a child brings to his or her
parents.81
3. Minnesota Court of Appeals' Rejection of a Parent's Claim
for Loss of Consortium
Like the supreme court in Salin, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals in Father A v. Moran2 ignored much of the precedent
relating to the parent-child relationship. The court instead
relied solely upon the dicta in Salin and the holdings of two
other cases to reject a parent's claim for loss of consortium.83
74. 37 N.W.2d 543 (Minn. 1949).
75. Id. at 545.
76. In re Parks' Petition, 127 N.W.2d 548, 553 (Minn. 1964). The court held
that an adoption was ineffective unless both natural parents had expressly
waived their parental rights. Id. Although the legislature's primary purpose
in passing adoption statutes was to protect the child, the court concluded that
implicit in the statutes was the belief that a child is best protected when the
law recognizes the natural rights of the parents. Id. Those rights, the court
said, include the "custody, society, comfort, and services of the child." Id.
77. Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 176 (Minn. 1977).
78.. Id.
79. That is, the court held that parents who give birth after one of them
has been surgically sterilized can sue the doctor for the cost of rearing the
unwanted child. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 176 n.12.
82. 469 N.W.2d 503 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
83. Id. at 506. Besides Salin, the court also relied upon Eichten v. Central
Minn. Coop. Power Ass'n, 28 N.W.2d 862, 871 (1947) and Dentinger v. Uleberg,
213 N.W. 377, 377 (1927). Father A, 469 N.W.2d at 506. See infra note 89
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In Father A, a minor who had been sexually abused by a
neighbor, suffered a severe personality change.84 The court of
appeals reversed the trial court's decision to grant the parents
a portion of the child's punitive damages award because "[u]nder
Minne-sota law, parents' recovery based on injury to their child
does not include damages for loss of consortium."85
In addition to the statement in Salin limiting loss-of-
consortium damages only to the spousal relationship,86 the
court of appeals relied upon two other cases87 for the proposi-
tion that Minnesota law did not allow parents of an injured child
to recover anything more than medical expenses and the value
of the child's potential earnings. 8 In neither case did the
Minne-sota Supreme Court address loss of consortium. 9
(discussing the Eichten and Dentinger decisions).
84. Father A, 469 N.W.2d at 505.
85. Id. at 507. Although the court showed sympathy for the plaintiffs'
claim, it said it was bound by the Salin decision: "he Minnesota Supreme
Court has explicitly denied a cause of action for loss of consortium in the
parent-child context." Id. at 506.
86. Salin v. Kloempken, 322 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1982). See supra
notes 58-63 and accompanying text (explaining the court's decision in Salin).
87. Eichten, 28 N.W.2d 862, 871 (1947); Dentinger, 213 N.W. 377, 377
(1927).
88. Father A, 469 N.W.2d at 506 (stating that "[uinder traditional
Minnesota common law, parents may recover damages based on injury to their
child only for medical expenses, and for loss of the child's earnings, contri-
butions, and services that the parents would have received until the child
reached the majority age").
89. It is significant that in both Eichten and Dentinger, the court decided
in favor of the plaintiff, and did nothing more than grant the damages
requested. It is apparent from the procedural posture in both cases that the
parties did not litigate the loss-of-consortium issue. Consequently, the issues
regarding a limitation of a parent's damages were never briefed, argued, or
considered. In both Eichten and Dentinger, it was the defendant who was
appealing a decision to extend the parental cause of action beyond what it had
been before. In Eichten, the court actually expanded a parent's ability to
recover an injured child's medical expenses from the tortfeasor. Eichten v.
Central Minn. Coop. Power Ass'n, 28 N.W.2d 862, 866, 871 (1947). One of the
grounds upon which the defendant appealed was the excessiveness of damages.
The trial court, in that case, awarded the father of a severely injured infant
$2500 for medical expenses and loss of services. The court held that the
damages were not extensive because many of the injuries were permanent, and
that the father was entitled to loss of services even though evidence of such was
"indirect, hypothetical, and to some extent speculative." Id. Similarly, in
Dentinger, the court's only holding was that the parent, and not the child, could
recover the injured child's medical expenses from the tortfeasor. Dentinger v.
Uleberg, 213 N.W. 377, 377 (1927). In neither case did the court limit the
parents' claims nor hold that medical expenses and loss of services were the
only damages a parent could seek following an injury to a minor child.
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II. PARENTS CLAIM FOR LOSS OF CONSORTIUM AND
MINNESOTA LAW UNDER FATHER A V MORAN AND
SALIN V KLOEMPKEN: MISREADING OF PRECEDENT
AND MISAPPLICATION OF STARE DECISIS
The Minnesota Supreme Court has never expressly denied
a parent's claim for loss of consortium."0 Although the court of
appeals in Father A v. Moran stated that it was following
supreme court precedent in denying a parent's claim for loss-of-
consortium damages with an injured child,9' none of the cases
it relied upon expressly stood for such a proposition. 2 The
court of appeals, therefore, was mistaken in arriving at such a
conclusion without independently analyzing the claim.
A. THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT AND A PARENTS
LOSS-OF-CONSORTIUM CLAIM
Although Minnesota courts have not recognized a claim for
loss-of-consortium damages in the parent-child relationship,9"
the Minnesota Supreme Court has not expressly denied a
parent's claim for loss of consortium.94 In Salin, the supreme
court held that the child of a physically injured parent could not
recover loss-of-consortium damages.95 In dicta, the supreme
court additionally announced, "[sitrong policy reasons, beyond
those already mentioned, argue against extension of liability to
loss of consortium of the parent-child relationship."96 Subse-
Nevertheless, the Minnesota Court of Appeals interpreted these holdings to
impose such limitations. Father A, 469 N.W.2d at 506.
90. Supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text (explaining that the court in
Salin expressly denied only a child's claim for loss of consortium).
91. 469 N.W.2d at 506.
92. A closer look at those three cases makes it clear that the issues unique
to a parent's claim for loss of consortium have never been addressed by the
state's highest court. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (explaining that
in neither Eichten nor Dentinger did the court address the loss-of-consortium
issue).
93. Father A v. Moran, 469 N.W.2d 503, 506 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (stating
"after careful review of the relevant precedents, we conclude that such an
expansion of parents' recovery is not consistent with Minnesota law"). This
finding, however, is quite distinct from the proposition that. Minnesota courts
have expressly prohibited loss of consortium in the parent-child relationship.
94. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text (explaining that in Salin
the court expressly denied only a child's claim for loss of consortium).
95. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text (explaining the court's
decision in Salin).
96. Salin v. Kloempken, 322 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1982).
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quently, the court of appeals in Father A erroneously extended
the Salin holding to decide an issue never directly considered by
the supreme court: whether to allow a parent's claim for loss of
consortium following a negligent injury to a child." Neither
the supreme court in Salin nor the court of appeals in Father A,
however, addressed those arguments in the context of a parent's
claim for loss of consortium with a negligently injured child.9"
Undoubtedly, some of the policy considerations the court
relied upon in rejecting the claim are the same regardless of
whether the plaintiff is a parent or a child.99 Other policy
concerns the court relied upon in Salin, however, are unique to
those claims that only a child may bring. These include
precedent limiting a parent's recovery to medical expenses and
lost services,'00 the threat of expansive litigation,'01 the po-
tential for fraudulent claims,' 2 the lack of foreseeability,103
and the extended burden such damages will have on insurance
companies.'0 4
When the parent, and not the child, seeks loss-of-consortium
damages, however, the pool of potential claimants is finite,
effectively reducing the threat of fraudulent claims, excessive
liability, and the extended burden on insurance companies.
Furthermore, the foreseeability of harm to the parent-child
relationship is much higher when it is the parent, and not the
child, who seeks loss-of-consortium damages. Because nearly
every minor child lives with parents, it is highly likely that a
parent will suffer greatly when there is a serious injury to the
child. When the injured person is an adult, however, it is more
difficult to foresee that a minor child will be harmed by the
injury since many adults do not have children. Consequently,
there is less certainty that a child will claim loss-of-consortium
97. Salin, 322 N.W.2d at 738. For a description of the court's decision in
Salin, see supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 58-63, 82-89 and accompanying text (describing the
decisions in Salin and Father A).
99. These include the potential that juries might award damages for loss
of consortium both in the derivative claim and in the direct claim, the lack of
a physical injury to the plaintiff, and the difficulty in determining the
"intangible nature of the [plaintiff's] loss." Salin, 322 N.W.2d at 738-41.
100. Id. at 738.
101. Id. at 738-39.
102. Id. at 739.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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damages because of an injured parent."5
Although the Minnesota Supreme Court decided in Salin
that children could not recover loss-of-consortium damages
because of an injured parent,"6 the court did not make an
independent consideration of a parent's claim for loss-of-
consortium damages with a severely injured child. Therefore,
the court of appeals was incorrect in its finding that the supreme
court specifically precluded such a claim.
B. MINNESOTA'S RECOGNITION OF THE VALUE OF
PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIPS
The Minnesota Supreme Court's failure to recognize claims
for the negligent damage of the parent-child relationship'0 °
conflicts with its own recognition of the value and importance of
the parent-child relationship in at least three contexts: inten-
tional interference, wrongful death, and wrongful conception. In
each of these areas, the court recognized not only the importance
of the relationship, but also the benefit, for both the parents and
the children in protecting the relationship from interference.
1. Minnesota's Compensation of Parents for Intentional
Interference with the Parent-Child Relationship
Minnesota law compensates a parent for damage to his or
her relationship with a child when a tortfeasor's action inten-
tionally harms that relationship.' s In Miller v. Monsen, the
105. This Note does not differentiate a parent's claim from a child's claim to
diminish the validity of a child's loss-of-consortium claim with a severely
injured parent. Rather, this Note offers the above-mentioned arguments to
show that consideration of a child's claim for loss of consortium is different from
consideration of a parent's claim. See supra notes 44-45 (demonstrating that
many states treat the two claims differently).
106. Salin v. Kloempken, 322 N.W.2d 736, 742 (Minn. 1982).
107. Id. at 738.
108. Miller v. Monsen, 37 N.W.2d 543, 545 (Minn. 1949) (holding that
children, as well as parents, can recover for intentional interference with the
family relationship). In Monsen, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed a
decision granting a minor child damages for the loss of consortium with her
mother who the defendant enticed away from the family home. Id. at 549. The
question for decision in the case was whether "a minor child has a cause of
action against one enticing its parent from their family home to recover
damages sustained as a result of the enticement." Id. at 544. The court found
the defendant, who convinced the mother of the plaintiff to leave the family
farm and live with him, liable for "destroy[ing] the relation then existing
between plaintiff and her mother, thereby causing plaintiff loss of benefits
flowing to her from such a relationship." Id. The court based its decision on the
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supreme court recognized a child's right to recover for "nurture
and training-physical, intellectual, and moral,""9 largely
because the right was already a "well-settled one.""0 In both
a parent's and a child's claim for direct interference by a third
party with the parent-child relationship, courts base their
holdings upon the principle that when there is a legal wrong,
"there should be a remedy to obtain redress." " In Monsen,
the legal wrong was alienation of affection, which the court
defined as the unreasonable and direct interference by the
tortfeasor with the child's "privilege of receiving benefits" from
her mother."2
By disallowing similar compensation when a tortfeasor
damages the relationship through mere negligence, however,
both Salin and Father A failed to address the distinction
between loss-of-consortium damages based upon intentional
interference and those resulting from negligence."' In
Monsen, however, the court attempted to distinguish these two
by allowing a claim for loss of consortium only when the
tortfeasor intended to damage the parent-child relationship.14
right of every member of the family "to protect family rights against outside
interference," and the state's "interest in the protection thereof." Id. at 545.
The state's interest in protecting this relationship is that it "is the foundation
of civil society.... Human society could not endure without it." Id. Likewise,
courts compensate a parent's claim for loss of consortium when a third party
intentionally interferes with the familial relationship by enticing a child away
from the family. FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS 170-72 (P.A. Landon
ed., 15th ed. 1951).
109. Monsen, 37 N.W.2d at 545.
110. Id. at 548.
111. Id. at 546.
112. Id. at 548.
113. Earlier in Eschenbach v. Benjamin, however, the supreme court stated
that "the distinction between such cases ... is that in an [intentional
interference] case the injury is directly suffered by [the loss-of-consortium
plaintiff]. In such circumstances the husband, who chose to leave the family
and therefore was not harmed in any way, could, of course, not recover any
damages; hence the wrongdoer would not be subjected to double damages." 263
N.W. 154, 155 (Minn. 1935) (holding that neither the minor children nor the
wife of an injured father and husband can recover loss-of-consortium damages).
While Thill v. Modern Erecting Co., 170 N.W.2d 865, 868 n.2 (Minn. 1969),
overturned the portion of Eschenbach denying a wife's loss-of-consortium
damages, the portion of the decision denying a child a similar claim remains
controlling law under Father A v. Moran, 469 N.W.2d 503, 506 (Minn. Ct. App.
1991).
114. Miller v. Monsen, 37 N.W.2d 543, 547 (Minn. 1949) (stating that the
child's "rights are to be determined by whether its rights [in the relationship]
have been [directly] violated and not whether its parents' [rights] have been").
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Such a distinction, while valid, would invalidate all loss-of-
consortium claims based on negligence, including those outside
the parent-child relationship."5
The court in Monsen also used deterrence as a justification
for its distinction between intentional interference and negli-
gence.116  Such a consideration, while relevant in Monsen,
strays from the main focus of tort law, which is not deter-
rence," ' but loss allocation."' Once the court finds fault, it
will afford a remedy for any real loss held to be within the
universe of compensable harms, unless policy concerns dictate
otherwise." 9 The interference with the parent-child relation-
ship, whether intentional or negligent, clearly causes a real loss
within the universe of compensable harm. 20 Consequently,
the only valid justification upon which courts may deny this
claim is not under deterrence, but public policy.''
115. Were the court's reason for denying a child's claim for loss-of-consortium
damages based solely on the proposition that the tortfeasor did not directly
damage the parent-child relationship, then the same argument would hold for
a tortfeasor who did not directly damage the husband-wife relationship.
Because Minnesota recognizes a spouse's loss of consortium with a negligently
injured spouse, the justifications for denying a parent's loss-of-consortium
damages must lay elsewhere.
116. Monsen, 37 N.W.2d at 547-49. In Monsen, the court gives three reasons
for recognizing a loss-of-consortium claim where intentional interference caused
the injury: the parents would not otherwise be able to recover, the act was
committed directly against them, and deterrence. Id. at 549 (placing emphasis
on the wrongful behavior of a tortfeasor). Ofthese three reasons for recognizing
a claim, only the last two apply. In the case of a negligently inflicted severance,
the parents also are not able to otherwise recover for the loss of the relation-
ship.
117. KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 3, at 15-16. Negligence, by definition,
cannot be deterred. The justification for allowing damages in negligence is loss
allocation. "Therefore, the true purpose of compensatory damages is generally
to adjust losses between the parties, not expressly to punish the defendant."
Mogill, supra note 17, at 1388 n.392.
118. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (explaining that the focus of
tort law is to compensate the injured party).
119. Foreseeability, remoteness and policy considerations all play into a
court's determination of proximate cause. See supra note 14 and accompanying
text (explaining proximate cause); see generally Salin v. Kloempken, 322 N.W.2d
736 (Minn. 1982) (treating proximate cause in the context of a loss-of-
consortium claim).
120. See Monsen, 37 N.W.2d at 549 (holding that the relationship interest
between parent and child is compensable); see also supra notes 12, 13 and
accompanying text (laying out the parameters in which courts have found
compensable harm).
121. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (noting that most decisions
in which the courts have denied loss-of-consortium claims have been based on
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When a third party negligently interferes in the family
relationship, the damage is no less severe than when the third
party intentionally interferes.' Evidence shows that parents
have similar reactions when either severe and permanent injury
or alienation of affection results in the loss of companionship
with a child.1" Such impact often mirrors the impact parents
public policy).
122. In fact, when the injury is in the form of permanent physical injury, the
damage may be more severe. As Professor Clark wrote: "lilt turns out that
there is greater reason, rather than less, to give legal redress for loss of
consortium when it is caused by negligence than when it occurs through [an
intentional tort]." HOMER H. CLARK, JR., LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 10.5,
at 277-78 (1968). Clark admits that there is a difference between negligent and
intentional harms, but that the difference is not relevant in loss-of-consortium
claims.
What is the relevant distinction between the case where the
husband's affections are alienated by the "other woman" and the case
where he is so seriously injured by the defendant's negligence that he
becomes a human vegetable? Actually his wife is worse off in the
second case than the first. In the first she may get a divorce and
remarry more happily. In the second case, she can look forward to a
lifetime as a combined nurse and breadwinner.
Id. at 277.
123. See JAY BELSKY ET AL., THE CHILD IN THE FAMILY 103-104 (1984)
(stating that family's initial reaction to a child born with cerebral palsy is
shock, depression, guilt, denial, anger, sadness, and anxiety); VERDA HEISLER,
A HANDICAPPED CHILD IN THE FAMILY: A GUIDE FOR PARENTS 38-39 (1972)
(showing increased stress level for parents who care for handicapped children);
CHARLOTTE THOMPSON, RAISING A HANDICAPPED CHILD 14-34 (1986) (finding
that some parents are unable to deal with having a handicapped child and
should consider placing the child in a foster home); Alexander, supra note 50,
at 333-37 (describing the grief and stress parents feel when their children suffer
severe permanent injury); Siegfried M. Pueschel, The Impact on the Family:
Living with the Handicapped Child, 2 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 171, 187 (1986)
(noting that parents who learn that a child has a significant handicap suffer
from an extreme traumatic experience).
Much empirical evidence shows parents suffer both psychic pain and
physical illness as a result of a severed relationship due to intentional
interference. See SALLY ABRAHMS, CHILDREN IN THE CROSSFIRE: THE TRAGEDY
OF PARENTAL KIDNAPPING 162-81 (1983) (describing the despair, anger and
loneliness that the parents of abducted children experience); Alexander, supra
note 50, at 329-32 (documenting physical ailments which parents endure when
their children are abducted); see also JOHN E. GILL, STOLEN CHILDREN: How
AND WHY PARENTS KIDNAP THEIR KIDS-AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 166-75
(1981) (describing the different stages parents go through after being
intentionally separated from their children); BOBBI LAWRENCE & OLIVIA
TAYLOR-YOUNG, THE CHILD SNATCHERS 168-70 (1983) (showing that parents'
trauma of child loss often includes physical trauma).
The emotional impact of a parent whose child has been kidnapped often
leads to self-blame, feelings of powerlessness, sorrow, bitterness and fear,
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feel upon a child's death. 24 In many cases, a severe and
permanent injury to a child would cause more harm to the
family than a child's departure through abduction or other-
wise."' The loss, therefore, is no less worthy of a legal
remedy.'26 Accordingly, Minnesota courts should provide an
adequate remedy, not to deter future wrongdoers, but to properly
allocate the loss.
2. Compensating Parents for Wrongful Death of Child
Interestingly, Minnesota courts follow the loss-allocation
paradigm when the parent-child relationship is severed by death,
rather than serious injury. In a wrongful death case, Minnesota
law allows a parent to recover for the "pecuniary loss resulting
from the death,"2 ' even when the tortfeasor is merely negli-
gent. The Minnesota Supreme Court has interpreted such
alcoholism, anorexia, nervous breakdowns and suicide. A social worker quoted
in the study said: "parents experience severe depression because the core of a
parent is the belief that he or she can protect the child. When that youngster
is taken away, it's as if the parent's life were being taken away. A lot of their
strength goes too." ABRAHMS, supra, at 167.
124. See, e.g., Christine H. Littlefield & J. Philippe Rushton, When a Child
Dies: The Sociobiology of Bereavement, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 797
(1986) (documenting the grief parents feel when their children die); see also LEO
GOLDBERGER & SHLOMO BREzNITZ, HANDBOOK OF STRESS: THEORETICAL AND
CLINICAL ASPECTS 342 (1982) (proposing that the death of a child was the most
stressful of 102 common life events).
125. A severe injury, for example, can be irreversible, whereas a child's
departure can be temporary. A severely injured child also can confront the
parent daily, whereas a departed child obviously will not be present to
constantly remind the parent of what was lost. Additionally, in the intentional
interference cases, the person with whom the loss-of-consortium plaintiff had
a relationship can return.
126. In Monsen, the court said that arguments stating that courts are
incapable of defining such intangible losses are without merit. "As has been
pointed out, courts and juries are required to do precisely those things in
certain cases, and do so with complete success." Miller v. Monsen, 37 N.W.2d
543, 546 (Minn. 1949).
127. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 573.02 subd. 1 (West Supp. 1994). The statute
reads as follows:
When death is caused by the wrongful act or omission of any
person or corporation, the trustee appointed ... may maintain an
action therefore if the decedent might have maintained an action, had
the decedent lived, for an injury caused by the wrongful act or
omission.. .. The recovery in the action is the amount the jury deems
fair and just in reference to the pecuniary loss resulting from the
death, and shall be for the exclusive benefit of the surviving spouse
and next of kin, proportionate to the pecuniary loss severally suffered
by the death.
§ 573.02 subd. 1.
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"pecuniary loss" to include loss of society, companionship and
comfort-in other words, loss of consortium."2  Yet the court
has refused to recognize a similar loss when the child, instead of
losing its life, loses all mental and physical capability.29 In
Salin, the court based this distinction in part on the fact that
"surviving children are totally deprived of parental consortium
while the plaintiffs here are only partially deprived."'3 ° Such
a distinction is unworkable, however, when a child is so severely
injured that he or she is incapable of any communication.''
In those cases, the surviving family members are "totally
deprived" of consortium, making the distinction in potential
damages available to the family members invisible, if not
irrational.
132
128. Fussner v. Andert, 113 N.W.2d 355, 358-59 (Minn. 1961).
129. See Father A v. Moran, 469 N.W.2d 503, 506 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991)
(holding that parents of a mentally disturbed child could not recover loss-of-
consortium damages).
130. Salin v. Kloempken, 322 N.W.2d 736, 742 (Minn. 1982). In this case,
the injured party could still communicate. The father was rendered a
paraplegic, but he had no brain damage and could still offer advice, support,
love and other non-physical elements of society and companionship. Id. at 737.
Similarly, in FatherA, the injured daughter had no physical injuries. Evidence
showed the daughter suffered emotional and psychological distress, but she still
could communicate and function. The court noted that she had managed to
continue her success both at work and in school. 469 N.W.2d at 506.
131. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
132. The Arizona Supreme Court stated that "no meaningful distinction can
be drawn between death and severe injury where the effect on consortium is
concerned." Frank v. Superior Court, 722 P.2d 955, 957 (Ariz. 1986) (en banc).
Other commentators contend that the loss suffered by a parent whose child
is severely injured might be even greater than the loss suffered by a parent
whose child is killed:
It is easy to see that the loss of a child through his death takes from
his parents the society and companionship that is the essence of the
lost relationship. But consider the magnitude of the loss of society and
companionship that occurs when a normal [child] is suddenly reduced
to a blind, nearly deaf, partially paralyzed child with the mental age
of three. The parental expectations for the continuation of the family
relationship are the same in either case.
Perhaps the loss of companionship and society experienced by the
parents of a child permanently and severely injured ... is in some
ways even greater than that suffered by parents of a deceased child.
... [Tihe parent.., is confronted with his loss each time he is with
his child and experiences again the child's diminished capacity to give
comfort, society, and companionship.
Shirley S. Simpson, The Parental Claim for Loss of Society and Companionship
Resulting from the Negligent Injury of a Child: A Proposal for Arizona, 12 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 909, 923 (1980).
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3. Minnesota's Recognition of Child's Value in Wrongful
Conception Context
Despite the assessment in FatherA that Minnesota law does
not recognize as compensable a parent's relationship interest in
his or her child,1 3 the Minnesota Supreme Court has held that
the benefit of a child's "aid, comfort, and society" is a significant
component of measuring damages in a wrongful conception
case.' Unlike parents who pursue loss of consortium to seek
compensation for the full value of a lost parent-child relation-
ship, parents pursuing wrongful conception are seeking full
compensation for an unwanted parent-child relationship. In
virtually all respects, the claims are mirror images of each other.
Yet, as the holding in Sherlock confirms, Minnesota courts have
treated the damage assessments quite differently.
When the parent-child relationship has been negligently
damaged, Minnesota law disallows any recovery based upon lost
"comfort, aid, and society."' 35 When the relationship has been
negligently created, however, the courts have reduced any
recovery by the value of the child's "comfort, aid, and so-
ciety."3 6 In essence, the courts have refused to compensate
parents for a loss to the parent-child relationship, while giving
credit for the same relationship values when the parent-child
relationship has been negligently created. For this reason, the
133. Father A, 469 N.W.2d at 506.
134. Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 176 (Minn. 1977). In
Sherlock, the court held that a woman who became pregnant after a negligently
performed sterilization operation could recover damages in tort. Id. The court
determined that the doctor's negligence created the situation whereby the
woman became pregnant, and that "elementaryjustice requires that [the doctor]
be held legally responsible for the consequences which have in fact occurred."
Id. at 174. Those damages included, among other things, the cost of rearing the
child to the age of majority. Id. at 175. In an effort to avoid unjust enrichment
by the plaintiff parent, however, the court reduced those costs by the "value of
the child's aid, comfort, and society which will benefit the parents for the
duration of their lives." Id. at 176.
In essence, the court said that a child, even an unwanted one, brings a non-
economic value to the family relationship that must be compensated for in a
negligence action. Id. at 176. Such an inference is logical, in that the court
admits that '[olur only reason for valuing the benefits of the child's aid, comfort,
and society against the life expectancy of his parents is that in the usual case
pecuniary benefits will be minimal during the child's minority." Id. at 176 n.12.
135. See supra notes 61-64, 83-90 and accompanying text (explaining that
the court in Salin expressly denied only a child's claim for loss of consortium).
136. Sherlock, 260 N.W.2d at 176.
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court in Salin illogically rejected a parent's claim for loss of
consortium as a novel damage request.137
The damage claims in both Salin and Father A were not of
first impression. Well before Minnesota courts decided either
case, Minnesota law allowed parents to. seek damages for a
negligent injury to their child. 3 ' Courts defined such damages
to be the measurable economic value of the child to the parents.
Yet, as the plaintiffs in Salin and Father A claimed, the true
value of the parent-child relationship is no longer economic. 39
137. See Salin v. Kloempken, 322 N.W.2d 736,740 (Minn. 1982) (stating that
"[sitrong policy reasons, beyond those already mentioned, argue against
extension of liability to loss of consortium of the parent-child relationship");
Father A v. Moran, 469 N.W.2d 503, 506 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that
the "Minnesota Supreme Court has explicitly denied a cause of action for loss
of consortium in the parent-child context").
138. In Eichten v. Central Minn. Coop. Power Ass'n, 28 N.W.2d 862, 871
(Minn. 1947), and Dentinger v. Uleberg, 213 N.W. 377, 377 (Minn. 1927),
parents were allowed to recover what the courts considered to be the pecuniary
value of their children following serious injury. In Eichten, the court employed
a flexible standard in measuring the lost services element of damages: "It is
true that in view of the age of the child the evidence with reference thereto
must be indirect, hypothetical, and to some extent speculative." 28 N.W.2d at
871. Similarly in Dentinger, the court said that the father of a negligently
injured son could recover "a fair measure of the value of any time lost by [the
son] up to the time of this trial." 213 N.W. at 377.
This measurement of services is not nearly as narrow as the courts in Salin
and Father A contend. In Bamka v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha
Ry. Co., the Minnesota Supreme Court said a parent of a negligently injured
child was entitled to "compensation for the care and trouble sustained by [the
parent], growing out of certain injuries to his minor son." 63 N.W. 1116, 1116
(Minn. 1895).
139. Obviously, if a child's economic value was positive, then the plaintiffs
in Sherlock would have been better off with the child and would have been
incapable of any recovery. As the court correctly decided, however, the economic
value of a child is negative.
At first glance, this might appear to be an argument against the recognition
of a parent's loss-of-consortium claim. In reality, however, it is an argument in
favor of such a claim. To this day, the court admits that a child has value to
the family. Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 176 (Minn. 1977).
The court nevertheless restricts the measure of the value to services and wages,
when the relationship is impaired through the negligence of another. Father
A v. Moran, 469 N.W.2d 503, 505 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991). Because the court no
longer recognizes services and wages as an accurate representation of a child's
value, however, the court contradicts its ruling in Sherlock, when it holds that
a parent can only recover for the loss of services and wages in a negligent injury
case.
On the other hand, if the court were to completely disavow a parent's right
to recover the value of a negligently injured child, it would be going against the
precedent set in Eichten and Dentinger. The solution consistent with precedent,
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It is, as the court in Sherlock stated, emotional. 4 ° Ironically,
in a pure economic sense, a family will find itself in a better
position following the death of or serious injury to a child,
assuming that the child is able to directly recover for his or her
medical expenses.' The proper measure of a child's value to
the parent, therefore, is the comfort, aid, and society taken from
the family. In Sherlock, the supreme court recognized this value
as both measurable and compensable. This same analysis
should be utilized in measuring the compensation due a parent
who loses the comfort, aid, and society of a child through serious
injury. 142
therefore, is to follow Eichten and Dentinger and recognize a parent's right to
recover the value of a negligently injured child, and to measure this value by
the standard set forth in Sherlock.
140. In today's world, children generally cost parents more money than they
are capable of providing. The child's food, clothing, shelter, medical, dental and
educational needs are but a few of the areas of parents' expenses. Others
include books, high-fashion clothing and child care outside the home. See
Alexander, supra note 50, at 312-14. According to studies, the average
American family spends $38 per child for every $100 spent on an adult.
Furthermore, this figure increases to $45 where there has been post-college
schooling. Id. at 312 (citing EDWARD P. LAzEAR & ROBERT T. MICHAEL,
ALLOCATION OF INCOME WITHIN THE HOUSEHOLD (1988)).
Consequently, the court's adherence to wage and service damages when
parents seek redress for injured children is outdated. CLARK, supra note 20,
§ 11.4, at 399 ("Since the services rendered to the parent by the child are in fact
largely insignificant today, the characterization of the parent's suit as one for
the loss of services has become a fiction."). It also is contrary to its own
valuation of the parent-child relationship in other contexts. Sherlock, 260
N.W.2d at 174. "IT]he trier of fact will ... be required to reduce these costs by
the value of the child's aid, comfort, and society which will benefit the parents
for the duration of their lives." Id. at 176; see also Miller v. Monsen, 37 N.W.2d
543, 548 (Minn. 1949) (stating that the privilege of receiving benefits is a right
which the law protects against unreasonable interference).
If children were not an economic burden, the presence of one could not
result in economic loss. Logic dictates that if a child benefitted a parent
economically, then the act of receiving a child through the negligence of another
would actually benefit the plaintiff economically. The court in Sherlock
correctly held just the opposite. 260 N.W.2d at 176. Alexander reported that
"[i]n contrast to the expenses of producing and raising a child, the monetary
return that young children produce is, with rare exceptions, negligible or totally
absent." Alexander, supra note 50, at 315.
141. Given this assumption, and the preference by the court that injured
children bring their own claims for pain and suffering and medical expenses,
the court in Salin effectively eliminated the parent's claim for a derivative
action established in Eichten and Dentinger.
142. The court in Sherlock ultimately found that the cost of raising the child
was greater than the value received from the comfort, aid, and society of the
child. Such a finding, however, was based upon the fact that the parent in that
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C. COMPARING PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIPS WITH
SPOUSAL RELATIONSHIPS
Courts often fail to supply reasons for rejecting a parent's
right to loss-of-consortium damages. Even courts that reject
the claim admit that the parent-child relationship is vital and
important.'" Courts rarely address, however, the true impor-
tance of this relationship. 145 As the court in Sherlock asserted,
purely economic considerations cannot adequately determine this
value.146 Courts must therefore look to the value of the child's
case did not want a child. When a parent chooses to have a child, the value of
the child's comfort, aid, and society will usually be greater than the cost of
rearing the child.
143. CLARK, supra note 20, at 398-99.
144. See, e.g., Salin v. Kloempken, 322 N.W.2d 736,737 (Minn. 1982) (stating
that "it is important to the child and to society that the benefits derived from
the parent-child relationship be protected"); see also Father A v. Moran, 469
N.W.2d 503,505-06 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (recognizing that the loss experienced
by parent's of a sexually molested daughter are genuine); Borer v. American
Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d 858, 866 (Cal. 1977) (stating"we do not doubt the reality
or the magnitude of the injury suffered by plaintiffs").
For a comprehensive study of the policy reasons behind loss of consortium
in the parent-child context, see Alexander, supra note 50, at 296-352. The
reasons listed by Alexander mirror those given by the Minnesota Supreme
Court in Salin: opening the floodgates to litigation, creating a potential for
double recovery, providing for intangible losses, increasing insurance costs, and
overburdening the alleged tortfeasor. Salin, 322 N.W.2d at 739; Alexander,
supra note 50, at 297-99.
145. Alexander, supra note 50, at 299. "Courts on both sides of this issue
have thus supported their opinions by using the same kind of rhetoric, but
neither side appears to have presented any empirical data that would give
concrete support for their conclusions." Id.
Parents often consider the relationship with their children to be "the
greatest source of pleasure" in their lives. See supra notes 50, 51. The efforts,
both physical and economic, taken by parents to obtain a child of their own,
emphasize the value of the parent-child relationship. Alexander, supra note 50,
at 296-352. Alexander reports that "i]f one looks at the specific dollar amounts
spent on the production and the raising of children, it is clear that American
parents today relinquish more of their economic resources to have a child than
ever before." Id. at 304. If children did not have a value equal to or greater
than the investment, it is unlikely so many people would go to such great pains
to acquire them. GLENDON, supra note 51, at 18. "In a purely economic sense
[children] are liabilities rather than assets. That people keep having them
anyway despite the cost is ... a 'revolutionary' change." Id. Some economists
account for this revolutionary change on the ground that children provide
parents with "psychic income." Quah & Rieber, supra note 51, at 169-70
(refuting the historical view that a child's value is based upon the supplemen-
tation of the family income).
146. Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 176 n.12 (Minn. 1977).
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companionship to accurately measure any damages to the
relationship. 4 7
Inconsistent to its holding in Sherlock, the Minnesota
Supreme Court determined that the benefits inherent in a
parent's right to loss of consortium with an injured child are not
analogous to the benefits inherent in a spouse's right to loss of
consortium." In short, the court held that the elements of sex
and child-rearing in the spousal relationship made the relation-
ship more valuable and, therefore, more worthy of compensation
than the parent-child relationship.'49 In recognizing a wife's
claim to loss of spousal consortium, the court defined consortium
to include such "undefined elements as comfort, companionship,
and commitment to the needs of each other."'50 It also re-
ferred to the predominance of the sexual relationship.'5 '
Previous Minnesota decisions, however, have not supported this
reliance upon the sexual element as the foundation of loss of
spousal consortium.'52
In establishing loss-of-consortium damages, the Minnesota
Supreme Court did not explicitly discuss the sexual aspect of the
relationship. 5 ' Subsequent decisions also have referred to loss
of consortium without explicitly mentioning sex.' While
there is no doubt the sexual relationship is a component of the
spousal loss-of-consortium claim, and that the court's reluctance
to mention it while formulating the concept probably was a
product of the times, the loss-of-consortium damages formulation
no longer contemplates sex as the predominant component. 5
147. "Why do people have children? Scholars have arrived at different
answers, but substantially agree that once a child is born, most parents hope
to enjoy the companionship of their child in a normal, happy relationship, and
that the bond they create with this child will remain strong throughout their
lifetime." Alexander, supra note 50, at 274; see generally T. BERRY BRAZELTON
& BERTRAND C. CRAMER, THE EARLIEST RELATIONSHIP: PARENTS, INFANTS, AND
THE DRAMA OF EARLY ATrACHMENT 9-16, 34-36 (1990) (discussing why men and
women want to have children).
148. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
149. Salin v. Kloempken, 322 N.W.2d 736, 739 (Minn. 1982); see also Thill
v. Modern Erecting Co., 170 N.W.2d 865, 867-68 (Minn. 1969).
150. Thill, 170 N.W.2d at 868.
151. Id.
152. Mageau v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 115 N.W. 651, 652 (Minn. 1908).
153. Id.
154. See Brandt v. State, 428 N.W.2d 412, 417 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988);
Mattfield v. Nester, 32 N.W.2d 291 (Minn. 1948).
155. Cf Reighley v. International Playtex, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 1078 (D. Colo.
1985). In recognizing parental loss of consortium, the Colorado federal court
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Most of the remaining elements referred to by the Minnesota
Supreme Court are not unique to the spousal relationship, but
common to the parent-child relationship as well.156 Further-
more, certain relationship elements, such as nurturing, teaching
and guiding, are unique to the parent-child relationship. 157 At
the most, the lack of certain elements in the parent-child
relationship should do little more than reduce the actual
damages amount of a parent's loss-of-consortium claim. It
should not move the claim entirely outside the universe of
compensable legal harms.
D. REASONABLE COSTS OF RECOGNIZING PARENT'S
LOSS-OF-CONSORTIUM CLAIM
In rejecting the extension of loss-of-consortium claims
beyond the spousal relationship, the Minnesota Supreme Court
determined that the costs of expansion outweighed the benefits
of compensating the deprived parents.' However, the court
hastily determined such costs without empirical evidence.
Instead, it relied on factors cited by other state courts that had
denied the claim,'59 as well its own analysis of similar factors
in the context of a claim for negligent infliction of emotional
distress. 6 ' The court primarily feared opening the litigation
floodgates by allowing parents' loss-of-consortium claims for
severely injured children. Such fears are unsubstantiated,
however, for at least three reasons. First, an objective definition
of the parent-child relationship will necessarily limit the class of
potential plaintiffs. Second, a Wisconsin study shows that when
concluded that the "rights and duties binding parents to their children" are very
similar to the same rights binding husband to wife. Id. at 1081.
Indeed, loss of consortium is 'a useful though ambiguous term having
a rather old-fashioned ring today.' While companionship may include
sexual relations, courts have continued to regard loss of consortium to
embrace all of those values-tangible and intangible-inherent in the
family relationship. ... [T]he term loss of consortium is equally
appropriate in reference to the parent-child relationship.
Id.
156. See supra notes 20, 46 and accompanying text.
157. See Frank v. Superior Court, 722 P.2d 955, 960 (Ariz. 1986) (en banc)
(arguing that the parent-child consortium is not confinable to an easy definition,
and therefore should not be precluded as a matter of law); see also supra notes
50, 51 and accompanying text.
158. Salin v. Kloempken, 322 N.W.2d 736, 739-42 (Minn. 1982).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 739 (citing Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 379 P.2d 513,
522 (Cal. 1963)).
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courts restrict parental loss-of-consortium claims to those
situations where the child is severely injured, litigation will not
run rampant. Third, the cost of compensating parents, while
potentially significant in individual cases, is neither prohibitive
in the aggregate nor a valid rationale for rejecting an otherwise
valid cause of action.
1. Utilizing a Clearly Defined Parent-Child Relationship
Fraudulent claims, as well as the argument that remote
foreseeability of injury will lead to unduly burdensome liability,
do not apply to situations where the parent, and not the child,
seeks loss of consortium.' Courts can eliminate fraudulent
claims in this context, for example, by clearly defining the
population of parents who are eligible to be plaintiffs. Whether
courts limit claimants to those who are either the biological or
adoptive parents of an injured child is insignificant--courts can
easily confine the class of parents to those who can objectively
161. See supra text accompanying notes 14, 44-49, 102. Only two states
recognize a child's right for loss of consortium while also expressly denying a
parent's. Conversely, of the eleven states that currently recognize a parent's
claim to loss of consortium, five expressly deny a child's claim. This indicates
that the policy reasons against a parent's claim are different and less
persuasive than are those policy reasons against a child's claim.
This Note does not contend that a child should not be able to state a claim
for loss of consortium, but only that such a claim has inherently different
dangers and requires an inherently different analysis. The greatest difference,
of course, is numbers. Whereas a parent can have many children, a child can
have only two parents. Thus, the number of parents' claims for loss of
consortium with an injured child is necessarily limited to two, whereas
children's claims for loss of consortium with an injured parent are not limited
to any specific number.
[Ilt is no less foreseeable that a child has parents who will suffer
genuine loss of society and companionship if their child suffers serious
injury through another's negligence, than that bus passengers will
suffer physical harm if their bus is impacted by a negligently operated
automobile. The liability boundary for loss of society and companion-
ship claims can reasonably be drawn to limit such claims to close
spousal and parent-child relationships. Judicially developed joinder
rules, rules barring subsequent parental assertion of a claim for lost
society and companionship if the child's personal injury claim has been
adjudicated or settled, and rules allowing defendants to implead any
potential consortium plaintiff should foreclose the argument that
recognition of the parental claim for loss of society and companionship
would result in a burdensome number of separate suits.
Simpson, supra note 132, at 925-26. In Michigan, the court of appeals said that
it was clear that "when a child is negligently injured a corresponding 'injury' to
the parent is within the foreseeable risk of harm." Sizemore v. Smock, 400
N.W.2d 706, 708 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986), rev'd, 422 N.W.2d 666 (Mich. 1988).
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prove a relationship with the injured child. 162 Given the finite
number of potential claimants, recognizing a parent's loss-of-
consortium claim would not constitute a "burdensome" extension
of liability.'63
The Minnesota Supreme Court in Salin, however, failed to
make this analysis. Instead, it concluded that, like claims for
negligent infliction of emotional or mental distress, a loss-of-
consortium claim required objective limitations to assure that a
wrongdoer's "liability for the consequences of her or his actions
[is not] unlimited."" In Salin, the court explained this rea-
soning as "somewhat analogous" to its decision to limit "the
circle of liability" in emotional distress cases.165  The two
situations, however, differ significantly.
In an emotional distress case, the pool of potential claimants
is infinite, thereby making it necessary for courts to incorporate
bright-line limiting devices such as the zone-of-danger require-
ment. 66 In a parent's claim for loss of consortium, however,
162. "[S]urely the parent-child relationship is sufficiently close to ensure the
validity of the plaintiffs claim." Love, supra note 17, at 603. Additionally, a
jury does not have to award loss of consortium where the relationship is
subjectively lacking. While juries should presume that claims based upon the
parent-child relationship are valid, they may reject claims where a plaintiff fails
to subjectively show a valid relationship. Similarly, courts can ensure the
limitations of a defendant's liability, extending liability to a maximum of two
people. Many questions regarding potential claimants under the parental loss-
of-consortium claim remain, however, such as whether illegitimate parents,
legal guardians, or adoptive parents may stand as potential claimants. See
Love, supra note 17, at 602-03 (discussing possible secondary tort victims).
163. See Simpson, supra note 132, at 925 ("The problem is not so serious
when examined in the context of the parental suit for loss of society and
companionship as, for example, in litigation arising from an automobile collision
with a bus; for an injured child has only two parents, whereas a bus carries
many passengers potentially subject to negligent injury.").
164. Salin v. Kloempken, 322 N.W. 2d 736, 739 (Minn. 1982) (quoting
Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552, 554 (Minn. 1980)) (holding that bystanders
outside the zone of danger cannot recover damages for injury caused by
witnessing an injury to another).
165. Id. The court in Salin then looked to its decision in Stadler, which
limited claims for emotional and mental distress to those claimants within the
zone of danger. Id. (citing Stadler).
166. In Stadler, the court was concerned with limiting the potential pool of
persons who could claim emotional distress as the result of an accident. 295
N.W.2d at 554-55.
A person's liability for the consequences of her or his actions cannot be
unlimited. The limits imposed must be as workable, reasonable,
logical, and just as possible. If the limits cannot be consistently and
meaningfully applied by courts and juries, then the imposition of
liability would become arbitrary and capricious.... Under the zone-of-
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the pool of potential claimants is already limited by parental
status. 67 There is no need for any additional bright-line
limiting device. The parental relationship itself provides an
"objective" determination of legitimate plaintiffs. 16
2. Limiting Parental Loss-of-Consortium Claims to Severely
Injured Children
The Minnesota Supreme Court refused to extend loss-of-
consortium damages beyond the spousal relationship because it
feared the proliferation of claims, potential fraud, and because
the foreseeability of injury was so remote it would lead to unduly
burdensome liability.'69 In both circumstances, the court drew
a line by determining that the cost of compensating the injury
would be too high. As the court previously stated, "We cannot
ignore the social burden of providing damages for loss of
parental consortium." 7
In referring to its fear of what it terms "litigation without
end,"' 7' however, the court neither justified this fear of in-
creased litigation, nor distinguished its prior holdings that
invalidated the proliferation of claims as grounds for denying the
danger rule the courts and juries can objectively determine... viable
plaintiffs.
Id. at 554.
167. See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the loss-
of-consortium claim is much more limiting on its face. Unlike emotional
distress, a loss-of-consortium claim depends on a preexisting relationship
between the claimant and the injured party. An emotional distress claim, on
the other hand, is based upon a person witnessing a catastrophe. Consequently,
an emotional distress claim is infinitely open-ended, whereas the loss-of-
consortium claim is not. Simpson notes that:
Inherent in a court's refusal to permit any new tort claim is the need
to delimit the liability for foreseeable injury. This need fosters the fear
that, if the parental claim for lost society and companionship is
recognized, inevitably the claims of anyone having the slightest
connection with the child must be recognized .... A parent's relational
interest in his child, like a husband's relational interest in his wife,
exemplifies the standard against which the genuineness of the
relational interest should be measured. A line can be drawn by
inquiring into the nature and genuineness of each relational injury,
rather than by asking whether a prospective class of plaintiffs-aunts,
uncles, cousins, friends-will be foreseeably injured.
Simpson, supra note 132, at 926.
169. Salin v. Kloempken, 322 N.W.2d 736, 739 (Minn. 1982).
170. Id. at 741.
171. Id. at 739.
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recognition of a new cause of action.'72 In fact, one study
found that "the dire consequences put forward as justifications
for denying recovery do not appear to occur."173 Defense
lawyers in Wisconsin, where a parent's right to loss of consor-
tium has existed since 1975,74 responded to a survey by
affirming almost unanimously that the availability of loss-of-
consortium damages has not opened the floodgates to litiga-
tion.'75 Courts can guarantee that such feared results will not
occur by allowing parental loss-of-consortium damages only
when the child's mental faculties are severely limited.'76 Such
a requirement would be consistent with the court's holding in
Salin, where the plaintiffs were the children of a mentally sound
father who had been rendered a quadriplegic. Because most
consortium elements are mental or emotional, it makes sense to
provide the cause of action only for parents of children who are
mentally injured.17
172. Miller v. Monsen, 37 N.W.2d 543 (Minn. 1949). In recognizing a
parent's right to recover for loss of consortium where a third party intentionally
interferes with the family relationship, the court said:
There is no merit to the contention that allowance of recovery in
cases of this kind would produce a flood of litigation of the same sort.
Assuming it to be true that to allow a right of recovery would increase
litigation, that fact would be no valid reason for denying the right, for
the plain reason that, if such enticement constitutes a legal wrong,
there should be a remedy to obtain redress.
Id. at 546 (emphasis added).
173. Alexander, supra note 50, at 348-52.
174. See Shockley v. Prier, 225 N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1975) (recognizing a
parent's claim for loss of consortium with a severely injured child).
175. Alexander, supra note 50, at 352. Additionally, defense lawyers
reported that other feared results such as increased insurance costs, difficulty
in determining damages, and fear of double recovery have not occurred. Id.
176. See Reben v. Ely, 705 P.2d 1360 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (involving a
severely brain-damaged child).
177. See infra note 178. Were proliferation of claims and potential for fraud
realities, however, the court's reliance on them to deny a cause of action would
still violate its own precedent. In Miller v. Monsen, 37 N.W.2d 543 (Minn.
1949), the supreme court held that neither the possibility of increased litigation
nor the difficulty in assessing damages is a valid reason for denying an
otherwise legitimate claim. Id. at 546. Interestingly, the court in Salin cited
Monsen for the proposition that "courts... should strive continually to develop
the common law in accordance with our own changing society," Salin v.
Kloempken, 322 N.W.2d 736, 741 (Minn. 1982), but ignored the most essential
directives of Monsen: "if [the third party's action] constitutes a legal wrong,
there should be a remedy to obtain redress." Monsen, 37 N.W.2d at 546.
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3. Independent Assessment of Parent's Loss-of-Consortium
Claim
For the reasons stated, it is incorrect for courts to conclude
either that the "social costs" of recognizing a parent's loss-of-
consortium claim would be substantial, or that the burden of
paying these costs would be inappropriately "borne by the
public." 78 In actuality, the decision to deny such a claim
unfairly leaves the entire burden of the damaged relationship on
the parent. Therefore, Minnesota courts should rely on their
precedents protecting the parent-child relationship in other
contexts, and compensate a parent who loses his or her relation-
ship with a child through the negligence of another.
Certainly legislatures and courts must continue to limit the
reaches of tort liability, addressing the increased insurance
premiums and attorneys' fees that have become a reality in
modern society. Yet given the way society values the parent-
child relationship and the methods available to limit parental
loss-of-consortium claims to a finite and deserving set of
plaintiffs, it is anomalous for Minnesota courts to draw the loss-
of-consortium line short of the parent-child relationship. 79
Accordingly, Minnesota courts should recognize that Salin limits
only a child's claim for loss of consortium, and should reconsider
the court of appeals' out-of-hand rejection of a parent's claim for
loss of consortium with a child who is severely limited by a
mental injury. In addition, given its recognition of a child's
value to a parent in other contexts, the Minnesota Supreme
178. Salin, 322 N.W.2d at 741. As discussed above, the limitations placed
upon the number of potential claimants and the necessity that the injury be
serious enough to render the child incommunicative ensure that costs will not
be substantial. "We do not believe that increased litigation will be a problem
because in the vast majority of cases involving injury to a child the injury will
not be so severe that the parents suffer a loss of society and companionship."
Frank v. Superior Court, 722 P.2d 955, 960 (Ariz. 1986).
Should the costs substantially increase, however, it makes sense that the
costs for such a real loss be spread throughout society. "As for the claim that
recognizing the parents' cause of action for loss of filial consortium will raise
insurance costs, even courts which have declined to expand loss-of-consortium
actions have rejected this argument." Id. at 961.
179. In holding that considerations such as increased litigation or uncertain
damages are inappropriate for denying a cause of action, the Minnesota
Supreme Court stated, "[aissuming it to be true that to allow a right of recovery
would increase litigation, that fact would be no valid reason for denying the
right, for the plain reason that, if such [wrongful act] constitutes a legal wrong,
there should be a remedy to obtain redress." Monsen, 37 N.W.2d at 546.
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Court should reconsider its holding that children cannot recover
loss-of-consortium damages with a parent severely limited by
mental injury, and disregard its own dicta that it will not
recognize loss-of-consortium claims outside the spousal relation-
ship.
CONCLUSION
Minnesota courts recognize loss of consortium when a
tortfeasor intentionally or negligently damages the spousal
relationship through injury or death. The courts also recognize
loss of consortium when a tortfeasor intentionally damages the
parent-child relationship through injury, or negligently or
intentionally damages it through death. Therefore, neither
precedent nor policy justifies the courts' unwillingness to
recognize a similar claim when a tortfeasor negligently damages
the parent-child relationship by causing severe injury to a child.
Minnesota courts already recognize that the true value of this
relationship is found in the aid, comfort, and society provided by
the child to the parent. Thus, when a person suffers the real
loss of such a socially important relationship through the
negligence of another, tort law compels and requires a like
remedy.
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